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SQUEEZE PLAY:
THE GAME OF OWNERS, CITIES,
LEAGUES AND CONGRESS
JOHN WUNDERLI*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the next ten years, twelve stadium leases will expire between NFL
or Major League Baseball franchises and their host community.' In the
next twenty years, twenty-eight (28) stadium leases will expire.2 The im-
pending expiration of a lease will often signal the commencement of a
game - an invitational sponsored by the affected franchise owner -
called "So you really want a professional sports franchise?" ("Squeeze
Play" for short). The players in this game are the owner, the league, the
cities competing to acquire the franchise, and the city fighting to retain
the franchise. At the end of the game, one city may win, the league may
or may not win, one or more cities will lose, and the owner will almost
certainly win.
The 1982-85 lease expiration season provided some interesting con-
tests. In 1982 Al Davis moved the Raiders from Oakland to Los Ange-
les, leaving the city of Oakland and the county of Alameda to pay $1.5
million a year until the year 2004 to service the debt on the Oakland-
Alameda Coliseum Oakland lost, Los Angeles won, the NFL lost, and
Al Davis won.4
In December of 1984, Philadelphia Eagles owner Leonard Tose an-
nounced that he was going to move the Eagles to Phoenix.5 In response,
the city of Philadelphia offered Tose: 1) rent deferment for ten years, 2)
stadium renovations, including the construction of luxury boxes, 3) a
* B.A. in Economics, 1991, University of Utah; J.D. 1994, Harvard Law School.
1. See Arthur T. Johnson, The Sports Franchise Relocation Issue and Public Policy Re-
sponse, in GOVERNMENT AND SPORT 229, (Arthur T. Johnson et. al. eds., 1985) (for the lease
expiration dates for Major League Baseball); Glenn M. Wong, Of Franchise Relocation, Ex-
pansian and Competition in Professional Team Sports: The Ultimate Political Football, 9 SETON
HALL LEGIS. J. 7, 46 (1985) (for the lease expiration dates for the NFL).
2. Wong, supra note 1, at 46.
3. Id. at 30.
4. This contest will be discussed in more detail, infra notes 52-73 and accompanying text.
5. Wong, supra note 1, at 33.
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new practice facility, and 4) promotion of the team.6 Tose accepted Phil-
adelphia's offer and the Eagles remained in Veteran's Stadium. The city
of Philadelphia "won," Phoenix lost, and Tose definitely won.
Within months, Robert Irsay threatened to move the Colts from Bal-
timore to Indianapolis, in spite of the recent $24 million in stadium im-
provements. 7 Baltimore responded by offering: 1) a $15 million loan at
8%, 2) $6 million in cash for a new training facility, and 3) guaranteed
ticket sales of 43,000 per game for the 1984-85 season.8 However, Balti-
more apparently was not up to the task, as Indianapolis "won" the Colts
with an offer of: 1) a new 61,300 seat capacity domed stadium, 2) modest
rent, 3) a $5 million training facility, and 4) guaranteed ticket sales of
45,000/game for three seasons.9 Baltimore lost, Indianapolis won, Irsay
won, and the league had a team move from the 14th largest market to
the 34th.10
Shortly thereafter, the Saints and the Cardinals threatened to move
from New Orleans and St. Louis, respectively. Baltimore and Phoenix,
both recent losers, threw their hats in the ring to compete for the
Saints." Also playing the game at this time was Jacksonville, with a
standing offer of an 82,000 seat stadium, new training facilities, sky
boxes, and a guarantee worth $125.8 million.'2 New Orleans fought off
all challengers, but at a price of a new training facility, tax abatements,
bond issues, and other public subsidies which were estimated at one time
to "draint ] the public coffers by $6 million in operating deficits and $10
million in annual bond payments."' 3 Phoenix and Baltimore lost again;
and owner Tom Benson won. However, Phoenix later managed a vic-
tory at St. Louis' expense when the Cardinals relocated. William Bid-
well also won, and the NFL watched as a team went from the 12th
largest market to the 26th.
Table 1 illustrates the pervasiveness of this game.' 4 It contains a
compilation of the win/loss records of the cities who either won or lost a
6. Id. at 35; See also Daniel S. York, The Professional Sports Community Protection Acr
Congress' Best Response to Raiders?, 38 HASTINGS L. 345, 352 (1987).
7. John Beisner, Sports Franchise Relocation: Competitive Markets and Taxpayer Protec-
tion, 6 YALE L. & PoL'Y REv. 429, 430-431 (1988).
8. Wong, supra note 1, at 40.
9. Id.
10. Based on the 1980 rank of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas.
11. Wong, supra note 1, at 36.
12. Beisner, supra note 7, at 431.
13. Wong, supra note 1, at 45.
14. The information for these league standings is taken from a table in Wong, supra note
1, at 27.
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professional baseball, football, basketball, or hockey franchise during
the 1971-1982 seasons. A city gets a win if it acquires a franchise by
relocation or expansion, and gets a loss if it loses a franchise by reloca-
tion or dissolution. The table only deals with events which result in
franchise creation, movement, and demise, and not with the competi-
tions which result in the status quo. Although not all of the contest out-
comes represented by the standings had the impact of a Raiders
relocation, it remains particularly striking that fifty-eight cities were in-
volved in the major league professional sports franchise game in just a
twelve-year period.
TABLE 1
Win/Loss Records of Cities Who Played the Professional Sports
Franchise Creation, Movement, and Demise Game During the
1971-1982 Seasons
CITY
Rutherford, NJ
Seattle
Portland
Foxboro
Arlington, TX
Nassau County
San Francisco
Orchard Park
Hartford
Landover, MD
San Antonio
Pontiac, MI
Tampa Bay
Rutgers, NJ
Anaheim
Salt Lake
Kansas City
Calgary
Minneapolis
Buffalo
Cleveland
Denver
Memphis
Norfolk
Houston
Atlanta
Cherry Hill, NJ
St. Louis
W L % CITY
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
1.000
.667
.667
.667
.667
.500
.500
.500
.500
.500
.500
.500
.500
.500
Phoenix
Indianapolis
Toronto
Birmingham
Cincinnati
Winnipeg
San Diego
Los Angeles
Dallas
New Orleans
Washington, DC
Vancouver
Ottawa
Detroit
Baltimore
Cincinnati
Pittsburgh
Miami
Philadelphia
Charlotte
Chicago
St. Paul
Hollywood, FL
Louisville
Commach, L.I.
Bloomington
Boston
New York
Oakland
Perhaps even more striking than the number of cities involved in this
game is the amount of money at stake. In 1984, it was estimated that in
W L %
1994]
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twenty years more than $6 billion dollars were spent to build or refurbish
stadiums to attract or retain professional baseball and football teams
alone.15
The initial question to be addressed is whether or not this competi-
tion between cities and the subsequent transfer of wealth from a city to a
franchise owner presents a problem that needs to be solved. The cities
obviously see some benefit in having a professional sports franchise
within its walls, and are willing to pay to have this benefit up to its per-
ceived value. The cities are, in effect, consumers of professional sports
franchises. A lease agreement between a franchise and a public stadium
more accurately represents a city's rental of a franchise than a
franchise's rental of a stadium.
This competition between cities for franchises would not be troubling
if a fixed number of franchises spontaneously dropped from the sky and
had to locate somewhere. In that case, we could justifiably rely on com-
petition to efficiently allocate the franchises to the cities who will benefit
the most from them. Of course, the cities with franchises would still be
troubled if a team subsequently moved. This should not be of great con-
cern, however, since it is not hard to imagine that after the initial alloca-
tion of teams, a city without one will emerge, obtaining better utility
from a franchise than a city which already has one. Teams should locate
in cities that value them the most. Nonetheless, this very scenario in-
volving a team changing cities has been the main focus of concern in the
courts and in Congress.
The troubling aspect of this competition among cities is that there is
no magical fixed number of franchises to be allocated among our cities.
Imagine if a firm created a communications system or product which
could interconnect citizens within a city and between cities. Imagine also
that the system was cost effective in all cities with a population of one
million or above. If this firm was the only firm offering this product, we
could expect: 1) that the firm would not produce a product for every city
over one million; 2) that cities over one million would compete against
one another for the available products, ultimately paying more than the
social cost of the product; and 3) the excess profit would go from the
taxpayer to the controlling firm. This would be troubling.
Similarly troubling, the owners of professional sports franchises, act-
ing collectively in leagues, decide how many franchises to "rent" to the
cities. If economic theory is at all reliable, this means that the owners
15. Wong, supra note 1, at 39.
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can be expected to not offer franchises at their social cost, but rather at a
price significantly above - a monopoly price. This will result in a misal-
location of resources. Consider the following:
[M]any of the families in Louisiana would find it tough to afford
even the guided tour of the Superdome, even though the people
of Louisiana subsidize the Superdome to the tune of $3 million to
$5 million per year... Meanwhile, the people of New Orleans,
many of whom are poor, pay the highest city sales tax in the
United States (9%), send their children to what may be the
poorest public schools in North America, and face cuts in public
transportation and city services.' 6
This quote illustrates the allocative decisions that cities must make. A
monopoly price charged for the Saints distorts the allocation of re-
sources. 7 It is this dynamic which should concern us and lead us to
reevaluate the rules of the game.
This article will look at questions surrounding the rules of the game
between team owners and cities. Of particular concern are these ques-
tions: (1) Who should make the rules of this game?; and (2) What should
the rules be? It will of course be necessary to try to identify what the
rules currently are, and who is making them. In addressing these ques-
tions, we need to analyze what the "players"'" want, or in other words,
what outcomes are considered to be victories.
II. THE PLAYERS
A. The Owners and the League
An owner must be considered a businessman first. As such, he19 wins
by maximizing profits, measured by the margin between costs and reve-
nues. Of course, this margin is widened by either increasing revenues or
decreasing costs.
A franchise's direct revenues, or receipts, are basically a function of
two variables: 1) the population size of the metropolitan area, and 2) the
team's winning percentage.20 For our purposes, our analysis is focused
on what an owner wants from a city, so the critical variable affecting club
receipts is the city's population size. Scully estimated that "each one
million in population is worth $2.9 million in club revenues, holding the
16. JAY J. COAKLEY, SPORT IN SOCIETY: ISSUES AND CONTROVERsms 62 (1990).
17. This will be treated more in depth, infra note 51.
18. By "players," I mean those involved in the franchise acquisition game: cities, owners,
leagues, and the federal government.
19. For convenience, I am not going to use gender neutral language.
20. GERALD W. SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL 119 (1989).
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quality of the club constant."'" So we would expect that an owner would
prefer his team to be in a high population area, and would only move his
team to a smaller statistical area if the lost revenues due to the move
were at least compensated for by a decrease in costs.
Decreased costs come in the form of public subsidies. These include
the following; 1) reduced rent for the use of public stadia, 2) construction
of new facilities at public expense, 22 and 3) tax abatements for privately
owned facilities. Not surprisingly, these are the most common demands
owners make on cities.3
In a world of franchise free agency, we would expect teams to be
located in the highest population areas. Since owners derive revenue
from the population base of a city, they will require more from smaller
cities and less from large cities. At the same time, it seems intuitive that
a larger city would have more resources to devote to a professional
sports team than a smaller city. So why are the Colts in Indianapolis and
the Cardinals in Phoenix?
First, consider the effect of revenue sharing. Revenue sharing insu-
lates the owner from the adverse effects of moving from a high popula-
tion city to a low population city. Since the receipts affected by the
population size are spread among all the teams in the league, a team will
only have to internalize a small fraction of the lost revenues due to the
drop in population caused by the move. The extent to which a league
shares revenues is the extent to which all cities compete on a level play-
ing field to rent a franchise. Since an owner need not consider popula-
tion size, the winning city will simply be the one which offers more
subsidies, or a greater reduction in costs.24
21. Id.
22. The construction of new practice facilities and improvements to existing facilities
could also be seen as affecting the revenue side by improving a team's winning percentage, but
for simplicity we can conceptualize all public subsidies as decreasing the franchise's cost. This
conceptualization makes it easier to analyze things like the affect of revenue sharing on owner
incentives.
23. Johnson, supra note 1, at 219. Johnson notes that about 25 cities were confronted with
demands for increased public subsidies between 1980 and 1985.
24. NFL commissioner Pete Rozelle claimed that revenue sharing actually contributed to
forestall opportunistic behavior before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
'Transportation in 1985. He argued that revenue sharing leads to less income disparity be-
tween teams and thus lessens the incentives for a team to relocate. John A. Gray, Section I of
the Sherman Act and Control Over NFL Franchise Relocations: The Problem of Opportunistic
Behavior, 25 AM. Bus. LJ. 123,132 n.29 (1987). I fail to see the logic in this argument. In the
same address to the Committee, Rozelle listed the St. Louis Cardinals as one of the teams
which was stable because of revenue sharing. I suppose the Arizona Cardinals are now more
stable because of revenue sharing.
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Once cities are on a level playing field, there is still an intuition that
the larger cities should be able to offer more than the smaller cities.
There are two possible responses to this intuition. First, while a larger
city may have greater revenues available to it due to a larger tax base,
this does not necessarily mean that the larger city has more funds to
devote to professional sports. With larger city revenues come greater
demands for those revenues. A large city may have social, infrastruc-
ture, and educational demands that smaller cities do not. The point is
that a large city will not necessarily have greater discretionary funds to
devote to professional sports than a smaller city.
Second, we must consider the marquee effect of a major league team.
A smaller city may be willing to spend more to be considered a "big
league city" than a larger, established city. Other reasons for wanting a
franchise will be discussed in the next section as we take a closer look at
the cities. For now, we must keep in mind that factors exist which dis-
rupt any natural stability of teams gravitating to the largest cities and
staying there.
These dynamics present interesting issues for a league. On one hand,
the moves of the Colts and Cardinals should cause the NFL some con-
cern, since both moves represented a loss in population and presumably
a loss in revenue to be shared among the owners. On the other hand,
the league is no more than the owners themselves, and it is this very
threat of relocation which allows each owner to extract greater public
subsidies from their host city. It is not hard to believe that the public
subsidies received as a result of the relocation threat more than make up
for the lost revenue of a couple of moves. However, the league still has
reason to be concerned if too many owners make good on their threats.
Major League Baseball has less revenue sharing and more group con-
trol over its members. We might expect that MLB would be relatively
stable, which it has been in recent years. Baseball owners must consider
the population base of a potential new city more so than football owners.
Nevertheless, as the demographics of the nation change, it is to be ex-
pected that new metropolitan areas will emerge to compete on equal
footing with an area in which a baseball team is currently located. And
although relatively stable, MLB still maintains the threat of relocation in
the form of the Suncoast Dome in Tampa/St. Petersburg. 5 The new and
25. Major League Baseball may be in danger of losing their best asset as the Piazza case
(Piazza v. Major League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420 (E.D. Pa. 1993)) goes to trial. This is an
antitrust suit brought by investors who had agreed to buy the Giants and move them to
Tampa/St. Pete, but the owners voted to prevent the sale. The investors won the first round by
1994]
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open Suncoast Dome, as well as the recent NFL relocations, serve as a
reminder to the cities that the franchise stability of Major League Base-
ball is due more to cities like Chicago building new Comiskey Parks than
any benevolence of the league.
History suggests that no sports league has made a strong effort to
prevent its franchises from moving. For example, between 1950 and
1982, eleven relocations occurred in baseball, forty in basketball, four-
teen in hockey, and thirteen in football.2 6 The few times in which a
league rejected a bid to relocate was directed at "mavericks" of the
league, such as Charlie Finley, Bill Veeck, and Al Davis. Furthermore,
Finley's and Veeck's teams were eventually allowed to move after they
no longer owned the team.'
Although moves from high population areas to low population areas
might be a concern, a greater concern to any league is owners moving
from low population to high population areas. An open high population
area represents an exploitable area for the entire league, either as an
expansion opportunity or as an open and visible "Suncoast Dome"
threat. Owners, acting as a league, do not like to see someone else ap-
propriating an exploitable area to themselves, as did the Raiders and the
Clippers. In either case, however, a team relocation can mean substan-
tial direct benefits to the moving owner at the expense of lost potential
revenues to the league as a whole.
The main point is that it is not at all clear, at any given time, whether
a league would favor a move of one of its franchises or not. A move
could mean moderate lost revenues to the league. However, a league is
a collection of owners, each concerned with his own opportunities to
maximize profits by pursuing increased revenue sources or decreased
costs. Most owners would want to be able to capitalize on future lucra-
tive offers themselves, or at least maintain a viable threat so as to extract
further concessions from their current host community. Therefore, even
if the owners could prevent any individual owner from moving, we
would expect leagues to continue to be very liberal in granting
permission.
defeating a motion for summary judgement on the grounds that baseball is immune from
antitrust. This case will be discussed later in more detail.
26. Johnson, supra note 1, at 232.
27. ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS 125 (1992).
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B. The Cities
Contrary to the artificial world which was constructed earlier by Ta-
ble 1 and the accompanying discussion, in which a city wins when it has a
professional sports franchise and loses when it does not, cities win in the
real world by maximizing the quality of life of its citizens. A city must
make many allocative decisions towards this end. Professional sports is
one of many uses to which a city can devote its resources. As a tool for
increasing the quality of life, a professional sports franchise must be
measured against social, infrastructure, health, and education needs. This
section addresses why a city wants, or should want, a professional sports
franchise.
Cities can be viewed in one of two ways, or a mixture of both, with
respect to professional sports. They can be seen as investors or consum-
ers. As investors, cities get into the business of professional sports to get
a financial return or, in other words, to reap direct and indirect economic
benefits. As a consumer, cities rent franchises as a means to obtain cer-
tain intangible benefits, to be used as a unifying mechanism, to generate
civic pride, to give prestige to the city, or as an educational tool. Let us
not also forget that a city is renting a team to provide another entertain-
ment outlet for its citizens.
Whether or not a professional sports team is a good financial invest-
ment for cities is a questionable proposition. It is clear that for a sports
team to be a good investment, the economic benefits must exceed the
costs. The costs to a city of having a franchise take many forms. There
are stadium construction costs and annual deficits associated with re-
duced rental charges. "Costs, however, may take forms other than oper-
ational expenditures and bonded indebtedness. Opportunity costs of
land use and foregone tax revenues are not analyzed. Costs for addi-
tional police protection, traffic control, and sanitation rarely are calcu-
lated."2 While it may be difficult, a reasonably accurate number could
be obtained, the result of which would represent the actual financial cost
of a franchise. It is more difficult to measure the economic benefits.
Johnson defines economic benefits, direct and indirect, as follows:
Direct economic benefits take the form of rental income, tax rev-
enues, franchise expenditures in the community, and increased
jobs. Indirect economic benefits include the additional business
generated by fans and participants in related industries such as
food, hotel, and transportation; the increased convention business
28. Johnson, supra note 1, at 224.
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a city attracts as a result of a team's presence; and the additional
jobs produced by the secondary effects of a team's presence.2 9
The direct and indirect economic benefits together represent the "eco-
nomic impact" of a franchise. The estimates of the economic impact of
various teams on their respective cities shows a considerable range of
potential economic activity.
It is estimated that the Packers economic impact is $20-25 million;
the Pirates, $21 million; the Raiders (in Oakland), $36 million in direct
benefits and $100 million in indirect benefits; the Jets, $33 million; and
the Colts, $30 million.3" Other estimates, however, have the Raiders (in
Oakland) worth $36 million in direct benefits and $180 million in indi-
rect benefits (or overall economic activity).3' Still others estimate the
Raiders impact in Oakland at $75 million total; and the Colts, $35 mil-
lion.32 And others claim the Colts impact is $21 million; while the Pi-
rates generate $37 million in economic activity.33
This range of estimates can be attributed to "alternative assumptions
... when researchers differ in skill or in predisposition. '34 The measure-
ment of indirect economic benefits is highly speculative. First, a multi-
plier must be chosen to estimate the impact of every new dollar spent on
the economy. The multiplier chosen can vary, depending on how self-
contained the area economy is, or how much "leakage" of economic ac-
tivity there is out to other areas. "Generally, the smaller the community
the smaller the multiplier because these areas have greater difficulty
containing all spending than do larger areas." 35 Multipliers range from
1.2 in a study of the Pittsburgh Pirates, to 3.2 in a team-financed study on
the impact of Chicago baseball.36 Even more distressing than the range
of multipliers is the implicit assumption that the use of a multiplier
makes; the assumption is:
that all first-round spending attributable to team or stadium activ-
ities is net new spending for the local area . . . . Spending on
sports may merely redistribute preexisting local spending. What
29. Id. at 222-23.
30. Id. at 223.
31. Gray, supra note 24, at 130.
32. York, supra note 6, at 354-355.
33. Beisner, supra note 7, at 433 n.24.
34. Robert A. Badde & Richard F. Dye, Sports Stadiums and Area Development: A Criti-
cal Review, 2 EcoN. Dnv. Q. 265, 270 (1988).
35. Mark S. Rosentraub and David Swindell, "Just Say No?" The Economic and Political
Realities of a Small City's Investment in Minor League Baseball, 5 ECON. DEv. Q. 152, 156
(1991).
36. Baade & Dye, supra note 34, at 270.
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if the dollar spent at the stadium or the adjacent restaurant is
merely one dollar less spent on entertainment elsewhere in the
city?37
The concern with this assumption is that a team only produces a positive
impact on the economy if it is attracting recreational spending from
outside of the studied economy.
Another issue associated with estimating the economic impact of
professional sports is the type of jobs created. Most of the jobs created
by teams are seasonal, low-wage, and part-time3 8 This means that the
presence of a team in a city could actually reduce the city's share of
regional income if the surrounding communities are "higher wage.13 9
Perhaps we should step back from the world of economic impacts
and consider the direct costs and revenues of the stadia. In 1974, Benja-
min Okner published a widely cited study of twenty baseball or football
stadia.40 He concluded that the average stadium covers only 60% of to-
tal costs, and noticed a tendency toward greater public subsidization.
The difference between the cost and the direct revenue on a stadium
must be made up by other revenues that the city government makes as a
result of the franchise's presence. In other words, the economic impact
of the team must be translated into an increase in tax revenues (or other
revenue source, such as public transit) under the same tax levels or rate
structure, or the franchise must be considered either a bad investment or
an expense.
Gray gives an example of a hypothetical city which invests $100 mil-
lion in a sports stadium.41 He assumes that the opportunity cost is five
percent, so the city would require a $5 million annual return on its in-
vestment plus additional revenue to cover its annual operating and main-
tenance costs (which he assumes are $1 million).
If the city could recover $4 million of this $6 million through new
tax and other revenues, such as increased sales taxes, entertain-
ment taxes, income taxes, and transit use generated because of
the presence of the franchise, the city could still recover its oppor-
tunity cost by charging the franchise tenant as low as $2 million in
annual rental fees.4'
37. Id. at 270-71.
38. Id.
39. ZIMBALIST, supra note 27, at 137.
40. Benjamin A. Okner, Subsidies of Stadiums and Arenas, in GovENNmwr AND THE
SPORTS BusiN ss (Roger Noll, ed., 1974).
41. Gray, supra note 24, at 131.
42. Id.
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It must be assumed that by "new tax and other revenues," Gray does not
mean that the city could raise the tax levels or create new taxes and have
that count as a return to an investment. The additional revenues must be
the result of real economic growth. Real economic growth is measured
in the subjective world of economic impact projections, which brings us
full circle.
To summarize this discussion of the economic impact of professional
sports, the factors to look for are: 1) the extent a team attracts spending
from outside of the area paying the costs of the team; 2) the extent
the team deflects residents of the area from spending elsewhere; 3) the
creation of jobs - look for whether they are permanent, temporary,
seasonal, full-time, or part-time; and, 4) the additional tax revenue gen-
erated by the above three factors, holding tax levels constant.
The question of whether a sports franchise is "worth it" financially to
a community is unanswerable in the abstract, and is very difficult, if not
impossible, even in any specific case. What is clear is that money is com-
monly transferred from cities to sports teams in exchange for perceived
economic and intangible benefits. There is reason to be skeptical of
claims that professional sports produce net positive financial returns to a
city, although this may be true in some cases. But in light of the strong
position of the owners in this game, it is not hard to imagine that any
financial gains which will come to a city as a result of a franchise will be
captured and appropriated to the team itself somehow. It seems more
realistic to view cities as consumers of the intangible benefits of having a
professional sports franchise.
As a result, we must look at these intangible benefits which the cities
are purchasing. Commonly cited intangible benefits include a boost to
civic pride, a unifying force, and prestige. If civic pride is meant to refer
to the lift the city gets through experiencing vicarious victory, then this
element appears to be a wash. If a city benefits from victory, it should
be acknowledged that it is harmed by loss. In which case, the affect on
civic pride must be considered neutral.
However, a professional sports team can be a unifying force whether
the team wins or loses. Whether a city is rejoicing together or commiser-
ating together, there is value in the fact that the city is doing something
together. It is important for communities to look for ways to bind its
citizens together. Communities will benefit from any mechanism which
encourages individuals to transcend cultural, religious, racial, political, or
economic divisions. Sport is central enough to the experience of the vast
majority of people to be a useful tool to break down the barriers which
divide citizens. However, it must be strongly noted that a professional
[Vol. 5:83
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sports team does not automatically have a unifying effect by virtue of
being a professional sports team. In fact, the same power a sports team
has to unify, it has to divide, if it is perceived as only for a particular
race, economic class, or culture.
Prestige is perhaps the most likely, and at the same time least appeal-
ing, reason for a city to acquire a major league sports franchise. There
are two main problems with pursuing or subsidizing a major league team
for the prestige it brings the city. First, prestige is merely a function of
perceptions which could quickly change. One day the city is a "major
league" city, the next day it is a minor league city for having a bad team,
and the next day it is a stupid city for spending so many taxpayer dollars
just so people will think the city is major league. Second, any prestige
that comes from having a major league franchise will be lost, and more
so, if the franchise leaves. "It's almost worse for a city's image to lose a
major league team than to have never had one at all."43
If the only thing a major league sports team had to offer a city was
prestige, then the competition among cities to acquire teams would not
be of concern, as it would be no concern if the teams magically dropped
from the sky. The competition would be as entertaining a spectacle as
the sports themselves, perhaps more so. A cynic would feel this way
about watching cities compete against each other today, musing at the
folly of the cities handing over large amounts of money to snake oil
salesmen in pursuit of illusory fame and riches. However, to those who
believe that a sports team can be a very positive element in a commu-
nity, the fact that two cities compete against each other for a sports team
when each is equally able to support a team is less amusing, especially
when the team owner is the one inviting the competition, setting the
rules, and profiting at the cities' expense.
A professional sports team should be a tool to be used to improve
the quality of life of the members of a community. A sports team can be
a very effective educational and communicative tool. The intangibles of
a sports franchise can be good or bad, but sports is definitely a powerful
medium. It may sound trite, but it is nevertheless true, that a sporting
contest has metaphorical qualities which lends itself to shared observa-
tion, evaluation, and discussion. It also has romantic qualities which
frame idealistic thoughts and memories.44 Professional sports can also
43. Baade and Dye, supra note 34, at 272, quoting Merlin E. Dewing, Chairman of a
Minnesota task force to revitalize the economy.
44. Perhaps professional sports are romantic in another sense. CNN reported a study
which found that cities with major league baseball teams have a 28% lower divorce rate when
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bring to the fore pettiness, greed, divisiveness, and an exaggerated em-
phasis on athletic victories.45 A sports franchise is a powerful tool that a
city can use to improve the quality of life of its citizens.
III. THE RULES OF THE GAMiE
There needs to be rules to this game involving the cities, owners, and
leagues. Determinations need to made concerning which cities should
have franchises, and under what conditions a franchise should be able to
move from one city to another. The rules are first concerned with who
should have the authority to make the necessary determinations: the
owners, the leagues, the cities, Congress, the market, or some combina-
tion? Second, the rules must concern what those determinations should
be, given different circumstances.
Basically, there are two working rules of the game: (1) teams cannot
agree not to "compete;" and (2) cities cannot "take" teams. In the world
of law, this refers to the law of antitrust and eminent domain. This arti-
cle will take the rule against the taking of teams as given and focus on
the rules within the framework of antitrust. Next, this article will look to
proposed changes or additions to the rules in the form of federal legisla-
tion from mandatory lease terms to mandatory expansion. Finally, this
article will propose what the rules should be.
A. Antitrust
Antitrust law and concepts can be both complicated and elusive, so
before we dive into the specific cases which concern our issues, it will be
helpful to identify the overarching themes and goals of antitrust. The
source of antitrust law which we will be focusing on is Section 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act, which condemns 1) every contract, combination, and
conspiracy in restraint of trade and 2) monopolization, combinations and
conspiracies to monopolize, and attempts to monopolize. 46 The Sher-
compared to cities seeking a baseball team. CNN television broadcast, Apr. 12, 1994. I can
certainly attest to the boost my marriage receives from those quiet evenings with my wife,
Keith Olberman, and Baseball Tonight; or from the intimate discussions with my wife over
whether we should parlay Frank Thomas into a blockbuster rotisserie trade.
45. For a complete discussion on all the potential sociological harms of sports, see gener-
ally COAKLEY, supra note 16.
46. 15 U.S.C §§ 1-2 (1937). The statute says "every" contract... but this is not taken
literally, much like how the strike zone rule is not taken literally. In fact, applying the Sher-
man Act is a lot like applying the strike zone, except the strike zone rule at least has clear
bright line boundaries on paper. For example, a fastball thigh high in the middle of the plate
is an easy call, but start looking at curve balls at the corners just above belt high and things get
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man Act stands as a far and deep reaching rule regulating the game of
American business and economic organization. The question is whether
it can reach our specific game.
Generally, the body of antitrust "common law" which has emerged
from the Sherman Act can be said to have two goals: 1) to achieve an
efficient allocation of society's resources, and 2) to prevent large concen-
trations of economic, and thus political, power. The antitrust laws rely
on consumer preferences to determine what is an optimal allocation of
resources. In other words, individual consumers choose to allocate their
personal resources among various products at given prices based on indi-
vidual preferences. These preferences are not questioned, but rather are
by definition, optimal. The aggregation of individual consumer choices
provides our societal allocation.
In order for consumer preferences to result in an optimal allocation,
the consumers must be choosing between products offered at their social
cost. If a consumer is faced with a choice between two products, such as
sports and education, and one product is not offered at its social cost,
then the resulting consumer allocation will not be optimal; a product
offered at other than social cost is said to create an allocative distortion.
This is where the concept of competition comes in for antitrust pur-
poses. Competition is the mechanism used by antitrust law to assure
that products are offered to consumers at a price which equals the social
cost to produce the product. Perfect competition in an industry will re-
sult in that industry's product being offered to the consumer at social
cost. The antithesis of a perfectly competitive industry is a monopolized
industry, characterized by reduced output and prices above social costs.
Antitrust law demands competition by condemning the practices which
move away from perfect competition and towards monopoly.
"[A]ntitrust supplements or, perhaps, defines, the rules of the game by
which competition takes place."'47
The focus on competition defines both the reach and the limitations
of antitrust law to achieve the ultimate goal of optimal and efficient allo-
cation of resources. Competition may not be sustainable or desirable in
an industry, such as one that will lead to a natural monopoly.48 In such a
complicated. As we shall see, antitrust has a similar feel. We can only be glad that umpires
have not developed a "per se" and "rule of reason" analysis in calling games.
47. PHiuip ARE EDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES
12 (1988).
48. A natural monopoly is where a single firm can satisfy the demand in an industry at a
point where its long run average total cost curve is declining; in other words, where one firm
can meet demand at less cost than two or more firms. Walter C. Neale, The Peculiar Econom-
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case, absent any wrongdoing, the industry is beyond the reach of the
antitrust rules, and other rules must be brought to bear on the industry
to insure that the product's price approximates what we would expect
under competition. Consider the following assessment by Areeda and
Kaplow:
[A]n otherwise perfectly competitive system will not always
achieve an efficient result.... [P]roduction at least cost will some-
times be possible only at a scale of production where a few firms
or even a single firm can satisfy the entire demand. In that event
competition will not be sustainable, price will probably exceed the
competitive price, and competitive efficiency will be lost. Proper
regulation could theoretically restore pricing efficiency. This is
one explanation of government regulation of public utilities. 49
So it appears from the outset that antitrust law may not have all the
necessary rules of the game.
The above analysis both frames the issues and reveals the conclusion
of this article: If a) the cities are treated as consumers, making allocative
decisions between, for example, professional sports and education; and
b) the product which the league offers to the cities as consumers is
viewed as the rental of a professional sports franchise, and c) each pro-
fessional sport is a natural monopoly5 , we would expect 1) that the
number of franchises available to the cities would be less than optimal;
2) the price of the franchises to the cities would be above social costs,
with monopoly profits going to the league members; 3) the effect of low
output and high cost will result in a distortion in the cities' allocation of
resources 51; 4) the antitrust laws will not be able to solve the real prob-
lem of sub-optimal allocation of resources; and, therefore, 5) external
ics of Professional Sports: A Contribution to the Theory of the Firm In Sporting Competition
and in Market Competition, 78 Q. J. ECON. 1 (1964).
49. AREEDA & KAPLOW, supra note 47, at 12.
50. See generally Neale, supra note 48.
51. Imagine that two cities are faced with an allocative decision in a two product world.
In this case imagine that instead of guns and butter, the products were professional sports and
education. Assume that the competitive price of one unit of professional sports (a franchise)
is $5 million and the monopoly price is $10 million. Assume also that one city would be
willing to pay $7 million for one sports unit and the other city would be willing to pay $12
million. At a competitive price, both cities would pay $5 million for a franchise and the rest of
their respective budgets would go to education. At a monopoly price, one city will pay $10
million for a franchise, while the other would not get a franchise and the whole budget would
go to education. In the first case, the monopoly price paid by the city means that $5 million
which would go to education under a competitive price will now go to the owner of the
franchise. This result sounds concerning, but is not the primary economic concern. The pri-
mary concern is that the second city would have been willing to pay the competitive price for a
franchise and was denied that opportunity. In other words, the city was denied the opportu-
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regulation by the federal government is necessary, and 6) this regulation
should take the form of setting a "price" for a city to rent a franchise, at
which price one should be made available to them.
We will return to evaluate the effect of our assumptions and predic-
tions, but for now, we must return to earth and take a look at the cases
which have sparked such lively discussion among courts, academics,
leagues, city councils, and sports fans.
B. Raiders I
In 1978, the lease between the Raiders and the Oakland Coliseum
expired. 2 That same year, Carroll Rosenbloom decided to move the
Rams from the Los Angeles Coliseum (Coliseum) to Anaheim.5 3 This
left the Coliseum in search of a new tenant and Al Davis, owner of the
Raiders, in an enviable bargaining position. After Oakland officials re-
fused to meet Davis' demands, he decided to move his Raiders to Los
Angeles, and so notified the NFL on March 3, 1980.51 One week later,
acting under the recently amended Rule 4.3 of Article IV of the NFL
Constitution, which requires three-quarters approval for any team to
relocate 55 to a different city, the NFL voted 22-0 against Al Davis' pro-
posed move 6 Two years later, a Los Angeles jury agreed with the Los
Angeles Coliseum and Al Davis that this was a violation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act.57 The Ninth Circuit was then asked to decide whether the
jury could be allowed to reach that conclusion. The court held that the
nity to pay for a franchise, and as a result, more resources were devoted to education than
would be optimal.
This sounds like an odd conclusion. However, the discomfort with this conclusion is
caused not by the effect of competition, but by the allocative priorities set by the cities. For
example, if a city's total budget is $10 million and it is willing to pay up to $5 million for sports
vs. education, we might justifiably be concerned, not with competition, but with a system that
relies on consumer preference to allocate resources. However, if a city's total budget is $200
million, it is not hard to credit a city's determination that after $195 million was allocated to
education, the marginal value to the city of a sports franchise for $5 million is greater than an
additional $5 million in education.
52. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1984).
53. Id. at 1384.
54. Id. at 1385.
55. Roberts suggests that to say a team is relocating is misdirecting the analysis since what
is at issue is not the location of the "team", but rather the location of eight home games. Gary
R. Roberts, The Evolving Confusion of Professional Sports Antitrust, The Rule of Reason, and
the Doctrine of Ancillary Restraints, 61 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 945, 948 n.11 (1988). Whatever the
merit of this distinction may be, I will continue to employ the convention of referring to the
team as relocating.
56. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1385.
57. Id. at 1386.
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jury could find that Rule 4.3 violated § 1 of the Sherman Act under the
circumstances.
In order to find a § 1 violation, an agreement between two or more
separate entities must first be shown. After an agreement is shown, the
court will decide whether the type of agreement conforms to a paradig-
matic fact pattern which can confidently be condemned as anticompeti-
tive without further analysis ("per se" treatment), or whether a more
involved analysis is required to determine what effect the agreement has
on competition ("rule of reason" analysis). Per se treatment is usually
reserved for cases in which horizontal competitors (separate firms offer-
ing the same or similar products to the same group of consumers) agree
to fix prices,58 divide markets,5 9 or not deal with a competitor or sup-
plier." A rule of reason analysis is for the non-obvious cases and re-
quires a balancing of pro- and anti-competitive effects of the agreement
in a relevant geographic and product market, as well as a look to any
possible less restrictive alternatives.
The Raiders court held that; (1) NFL teams were separate entities for
§ 1 purposes, (2) that "per se" treatment was inappropriate, and (3) that
pursuant to a rule of reason analysis, a jury could find that competition
for NFL football was diminished in southern California as a result of the
operation of Rule 4.3 on the Raiders proposed move. Therefore, Rule
4.3 violated § 1 of the Sherman Act in this case.
The claim against the NFL was that the individual teams agreed,
through the mechanism of Rule 4.3, to prevent the Raiders from moving
into the Rams territory and competing against them. On the surface,
this looks like an agreement among competitors to divide the market
and not compete with each other within those market divisions. Such an
agreement seems like a candidate for per se treatment. Yet the court
recognized the unique character of the sports industry, and it was confus-
ing enough to not condemn the NFL so quickly.61
1. Single Entity Issue.
Much of the difficulty of applying the antitrust laws in the sports in-
dustry stems from the various levels of competition that exist among the
teams in a given league. The central difference between an individual
58. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S.
211 (1899).
59. United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
60. Eastern States Lumber Ass'n. v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914).
61. Instead, it seems the court chose to confuse the NFL, other sports leagues, academics,
and law students in the same way the sports industry seems to have baffled it.
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sports team and a typical individual firm of production is 1) a sports
team cannot produce a marketable product without other sports teams,
and as a result, 2) it is not a rational economic goal of any sports team to
"compete" so well as to put the other teams out of business.6' Neale
concludes from this that all teams which cooperate to produce a single
"World Champion" should be considered as divisions of a single eco-
nomic firm.63
If teams were viewed merely as divisions of a single firm, then they
would be incapable of conspiring under § 1 of the Sherman Act. This
idea frightened the district court enough to cite it as the first reason to
not view leagues as single entities.64 The second reason was that "other
organizations have been found to violate § 1 though their product...
requires the same kind of cooperation from the organization's mem-
bers.",65 Given the examples used by the Ninth Circuit in agreement, this
statement is clearly wrong.66 The majority seemed to be concerned not
with the level of cooperation required to create the product, but rather
with who makes the policy decisions.67 The third reason given by the
62. These two dynamics are described in a more detailed and humorous way as "The
Louis-Schmelling Paradox," and "The Inverted Joint Product or the Product Joint." See
Neale, supra note 48, at 2.
63. Id.; See also Roberts, supra note 55.
64. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1388.
65. Id
66. The court cited United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), and United States v.
Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596. Both cases involved legally separate, horizontal competitors who
collectively formed an association, which allocated territories to its members. In both cases an
individual firm could offer its products to consumers, mattresses or a food product line, with-
out the assistance of the other competitors. However, the defendants in Topco, a case given
per se treatment, had a slightly better position. In that case, individual grocery stores agreed
to jointly create a food product line in order to compete with the national supermarket chains.
As a part of this effort, the stores agreed not to use the joint product line to compete against
one another. Topco is a disfavored case, however, because the per se treatment neglected to
consider the positive effect on interbrand competition.
This becomes relevant in the Raiders case when the product market is defined as NFL
football and not the entertainment in general. The NFL wants to argue that even if Rule 4.3
restrains competition among NFL teams, the rule helps the league compete better with other
forms of entertainment. The Topco defendants lost with a more compelling argument.
67. The court determined that "NFL policies are not set by one individual or parent cor-
poration, but by the separate teams acting jointly." Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n,
726 F.2d at 1389. Other similar statements lead one to believe that whether the court was
right or wrong on this point, it would not have reached a different result even if it had the
benefit of Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). It appears that
the Ninth Circuit had already determined that a parent corporation and a subsidiary could not
conspire under § 1: "[T]his circuit has found the threshold requirement of concerted activity
missing among multiple corporations operated as a single entity when corporate policies are
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district court and accepted by the Ninth Circuit was that the teams are
separate business entities whose products have an independent value.68
What seems to be driving this case and others which treat teams as
separate entities is the observation that "clubs do compete with one an-
other off the field as well as on to acquire players, coaches, and manage-
ment personnel [and] ... where two teams operate in close proximity,
there is also competition for fan support, local television and local radio
revenues, and media space."'69 The court wants to be able to force teams
to continue to compete in these spheres and wants to keep § 1 as a vehi-
cle to do so.
The Raiders majority, therefore, would have all league agreements
pass a rule of reason analysis in order to have the blessing of antitrust.
Roberts, on the other hand, argues that all league agreements should be
immune from § 1 liability.70 However, the dissent in Raiders would
carve out a functional immunity for "downstream" outputs, i.e. getting
the football product to the fans, but would maintain § 1 scrutiny in the
sphere of "upstream" inputs, i.e. players, coaches, and investors.
The dissent's argument has appeal because it appears to address a
concern that players would be exploited without § 1 forcing teams to
compete for them, while at the same time granting the league some re-
lief. However, with respect to the players, it is not at all clear that they
1) should be a concern of antitrust or 2) need § 1 to protect them from
exploitation.71 With respect to granting the league some relief, the world
of the dissent is not clear enough to be helpful. The dissent constructs a
functional test where the league is immune from § 1 attack in instances
in which "member clubs must coordinate intraleague policy and practice
if the joint product is to result."'72 It is not even clear that the present
case would meet this functional test. One might rightly ask why it is
set by one individual or by a parent corporation." Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n,
726 F.2d at 1388.
68. The Ninth Circuit backed up this conclusory and question begging reason by stating
that 1) the teams are all independently owned, and 2) although the teams share revenue, they
do not share profit or loss. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1389-1390.
It is not clear why these observations are important.
69. Id. at 1390.
70. Roberts, supra note 55.
71. I believe a league's product output and price will be determined independent of the
cost of the players input, since I maintain that player payroll has the quality of a fixed cost. If
this is true, the exploitation of a player will not affect the allocative decisions of a consumer,
but rather merely concerns the distribution of wealth between players and owners. This is
why I also believe that the best way to protect the players' interests is through the mechanism
of labor law.
72. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1409.
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necessary for a league to keep the Raiders in Oakland, or control any
team movement for that matter, in order to produce their product.
2. Rule of Reason Analysis.
The consequence of treating teams as separate entities in this case is
that a jury must now determine whether on balance the application of
Rule 4.3 harmed competition. The court allowed the jury to define the
relevant product market as NFL football and the relevant geographic
market as southern California. The consequence of this market defini-
tion is that the NFL loses. It would be difficult once the market was
defined as NFL football in southern California to find anything procom-
petitive about Rule 4.3 to balance against even the most minor anticom-
petitive effect.
If the geographic market was enlarged to the U.S., or even just to
California, the effect on competition would be a wash. The competition
lost in Los Angeles between the Raiders and the Rams if the Raiders are
prevented from moving would be offset by the competition lost in the
Bay Area between the Raiders and the Giants if the Raiders are allowed
to move. Similarly, if the product market were enlarged to include other
forms of entertainment, the NFL could at least argue that the "in-
trabrand" competition lost between the teams is offset by the increased
ability of the NFL to compete "interbrand."
Given the court's blessing on the relevant market, the comments
about less restrictive alternatives available to the league to meet its goals
seem meaningless. The court talked about how the league could flesh
out Rule 4.3 by adding some objective criteria which need to be met in
order to prevent a move. However, a different rule would not change
the competitive effects in the southern California NFL football market.
If at the heart of Raiders is the question of who gets to decide when a
team can move, the league or an individual owner, then the case will
have a very limited affect on the cities. A city that wants to acquire a
team would prefer, given a choice between the two, that an individual
owner be able to move at will. On the other hand, a city with a team
would prefer the owner to have to at least jump through a hoop before
moving. If the Raiders court contributed a valuable observation it was
that cities with teams should not place too much faith in any league to
look out for the cities' interest.73 Even if the league did begin to prevent
73. "The NFL's professed interest in ensuring that cities and other local governments se-
cure a return on their investments in stadia... may not be as important as it would have us
believe because the League has in the past allowed teams to threaten a transfer to another
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team transfers, this would merely represent a win for the cities with
teams and a loss for those who want teams. Raiders does, however, show
signs of reaching beyond a simple power struggle between one owner
and other owners.
An interesting, yet defective, market definition was advanced by the
Los Angeles Coliseum. The Coliseum argued that the relevant product
market was the market of "stadia offering their facilities to NFL
teams"74 in the U.S. The defect lies not in the definition of the market,
but in the Coliseum's contention that Rule 4.3 restrains competition
among stadia within this market. Roberts correctly points out that 1)
Rule 4.3 in no way prevents or lessens competition among stadia to
house NFL teams, and 2) the NFL's interest is for stadia competition to
be as vigorous as possible.75 Nevertheless, the Raiders court accepted
this market definition as possible grounds for § 1 liability. This is signifi-
cant because this market analysis can be applied to all team movements
prevented by the league, regardless of whether the team is moving into
another team's territory. In other words, the restraint applicable to sta-
dia does not rely on the fact that the Raiders were prevented from com-
peting with the Rams.
C. Piazza v. MLB
On August 6, 1992, Vincent Piazza and other investors ("Investors"),
executed a Letter of Intent with Robert Lurie, owner of the San Fran-
cisco Giants, to purchase the Giants baseball team for $115 million.76
The Investors intended to move the Giants to the Suncoast Dome, lo-
cated in St. Petersburg. The league refused to approve the sale and
move, and the Giants were subsequently sold for $100 million to a San
Francisco group which kept the Giants in San Francisco. The Investors
claim 1) that the league's actions "have placed direct and indirect re-
straints on the purchase, sale, transfer, and relocation of Major League
Baseball teams and on competition in the purchase, sale, transfer and
relocation of such teams. ..77
location in order to give the team leverage in lease negotiations." Id. at 1397. The leagues
collectively do not have a very good track record when it comes to voting against transfers.
See ZIMBALIST, supra note 27.
74. Los Angeles Memorial Colisuem Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1393.
75. Roberts, supra note 55.
76. Piazza, 831 F.Supp at 422.
77. Id. at 429 n.13.
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The issue of interest for our concerns is how the court defined the
relevant market.7" The Investors claim that the relevant product market
is the market for existing baseball teams. It initially appears that the
Investors made the same defective argument as the one made by the
Coliseum in Raiders: that the league restrained competition among po-
tential investors who wish to purchase a team. This is the characteriza-
tion of the market which the court first seems to create and accept.
79
However, at the end of the opinion the market analysis becomes
sharper. The court notes that a market may be defined as "any grouping
of sales whose sellers, if unified by a hypothetical cartel or merger, could
raise prices significantly above the competitive level.""0 The court then
defines the market in this case:
[T]his market has the following components: (1) the product be-
ing sold is an ownership interest in professional baseball teams;
(2) the sellers are team owners; and (3) the buyers are those who
would like to become team owners.... [I]t would not be unrea-
sonable also to infer that if the team owners combined, they could
increase the price of teams considerably and control the condi-
tions of sale.8'
This definition suggests not that the league is restraining competition
among potential owners, which it would have no interest in doing, but
rather that the league could restrain competition among the teams. This
is a much more defensible market definition.
The other difference in market definition between the Piazza case
and the Raiders case is that the Coliseum in Raiders argued that the rele-
vant product was stadia services, which it was selling, while the Investors
in Piazza argued that the relevant product was the teams themselves,
which they were purchasing.
78. This case is potentially much more significant for Major League Baseball since the
court spends a good deal of thought and energy virtually eliminating MLB's antitrust exemp-
tion. However, I will not address baseball's antitrust exemption for four reasons: first, the
exemption does not need more commentary; second, it is almost uniformly considered an
anomaly, with no good reasons supporting its existence; third, I want to focus on how the
antitrust laws can affect cities and professional leagues generally; and fourth, I do not believe
that antitrust is large enough to solve the real problems between leagues and cities, so base-
ball's exemption is of minor significance.
79. Id. at 430.
80. Id. at 439, quoting PHILIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANcrrRusr LAW
518.1b (Supp. 1991).
81. Piazza, 831 F.Supp. at 439.
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D. Relevance of Raiders and Piazza to the Cities
Regardless of the incorrect application of the Coliseum's market def-
inition in Raiders, a potentially viable § 1 argument from either case
could be made by a city which was denied a team in favor of franchise
free agency. For example, if a city and an owner have come to terms on
a deal which would move a team into the city, and the move is prevented
by the league, the city could argue that the teams are 1) collectively re-
straining competition among themselves to purchase the services of the
cities (in the form of stadia, for example) or 2) restraining competition
among themselves in the provision of sports franchises to the cities. In
the first case, the claim would be that the teams are agreeing to act as a
monopsonist, similar to agreeing not to compete in the purchase of "up-
stream" inputs such as players. In the second case, the effect would be
similar to price fixing: under a free market, i.e. franchise free agency, one
owner might be willing to offer his franchise for $2 million in public sub-
sidies, but without franchise free agency, the league could disallow the
move, "increase the price of teams considerably and control the condi-
tions of sale."'
The argument for franchise free agency can certainly be defended in
terms of allocative efficiency. If teams act as independent profit maxi-
mizers, they will locate in the cities which offer them the best mixture of
population and public subsidy - where the teams will be valued the
most. If confronted with a choice between having the Raiders in Oak-
land or in Los Angeles, it is clear they should be in Los Angeles. Pre-
sumably, the Raiders would either reach more people in Los Angeles, or
the Raiders had some other value greater to Los Angeles than to Oak-
land. The league, however, instead of allowing free movement of teams,
would rather keep Los Angeles open, either as a threat which all teams
could use against their respective cities, or as means to extract a large fee
from a prospective owner through expansion, similar to how Major
League Baseball is using the Suncoast Dome.
Al Davis personally does not present a compelling story: when he
bought into this industry, he contracted with his fellow owners to abide
by certain rules; instead, he "stole" a money making opportunity from
the league. This has led some commentators to conclude that the league
should be allowed to prevent this result.83 Yet, however offensive Al
Davis' move is to our sense of contractual obligations, the antitrust laws
82. Id.
83. See John C. Weistart, League Control of Market Opportunities: A Perspective on Com-
petition and Cooperation in the Sports Industry, 1984 Dutn L. 1013 (1984).
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should not be concerned with protecting the league's opportunities for
profit. Rather, antitrust law should be concerned with insuring that the
rules for making profit lead to an efficient allocation of resources.
Therefore, the themes of § 1 antitrust analysis suggest that there should
be franchise free agency.
This conclusion, however, reveals an apparent limitation of § 1 of the
Sherman Act in the world of cities and professional sports leagues. This
analysis takes place in a world of a limited number of teams, where cities
compete for those teams and the "best" cities win. In such a world,
franchise free agency would probably be the best rule of the game. Cit-
ies without teams would have a fair chance to get one if they wanted one
badly enough. Although cities with teams would prefer a world where
the team is forced to stay, at least under franchise free agency if the city
lost a team it would have a fair chance of getting another one. The prob-
lem, however, is that the number of teams is artificially limited by the
owners themselves, which causes all cities to make sub-optimal allocative
decisions with respect to professional sports. The question then is
whether antitrust is up to the task of increasing the output of profes-
sional sports teams.
E. Mid-South Grizzlies.
In 1975, the Grizzlies, a professional football team located in Mem-
phis, applied for membership into the NFL after the league they were in,
the WFL, disbanded.84 They were denied membership by the NFL, so
they sued, claiming that the NFL teams violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act. The court dismissed the Grizzlies' claim on the NFL's motion
for summary judgement.
The opinion appears to mix § 1 and § 2 issues in its discussion of the
case. The court briefly noted that the requisite conspiracy requirement
of § 1 was not in dispute. Apparently it was accepted by all parties that
the teams were distinct entities capable of competing for antitrust pur-
poses. Yet quickly after jumping over the conspiracy hurdle, the court
spends quite a bit of time discussing the NFL's monopoly position, cre-
ated by congressional fiats5, which has a distinct § 2 feel to it.
84. Mid-South Grizzlies v. NFL, 720 F.2d 772, 776 (3rd Cir. 1983).
85. The court cites two statutes that contributed to the NFL's monopoly position. The
first allowed sports leagues an antitrust exemption with respect to the sale of broadcast rights
in 1961. 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1961). The second, an amendment to § 1291, allowed the NFL and
AFL to merge. Id., amended by Pub. L. 89-800 (1966). One of the issues in this case is
whether this amendment mandated expansion since it allowed the merger agreement "if such
agreement increases rather than decreases the number of professional football clubs so oper-
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Eventually, however, the court returned to the § 1 question, which
requires a definition of a relevant market. The market identified by the
Grizzlies was major league professional football in the United States.
The court viewed the relevant competition to be for "ticket buyers, for
local broadcast revenue, and for sale of the concession items like food
and beverages and team paraphernalia."86 In other words, the court
viewed the potential competition between teams in the same way that Al
Davis argued and won in Raiders. The Grizzlies lost in this case because
there would be no other team within a 280 mile radius to compete with,
so their existence or non-existence as a team had no effect on
competition.
Yet what about the competition between teams that does not rely on
geographic proximity? The Grizzlies began to argue on appeal that
teams also compete for players and coaches. The court, however, re-
jected this contention by stating:
First, the Grizzlies exclusion from the league in no way restrained
them from competing for players by forming a competitive
league. Second, they fail to explain how, if their exclusion from
the league reduced competition for team personnel, that reduc-
tion caused an injury to the Grizzlies' business or property.17
At the heart of this case is the notion that the Grizzlies represented indi-
viduals who wanted to share a monopoly position with other co-inves-
tors, not compete against them. The court was confident that not
allowing the Grizzlies into the NFL would not harm competition.
The court also dismissed the Grizzlies § 2 claim without much analy-
sis. This case reveals the limitations of § 2 of the Sherman Act. A viola-
tion of § 2 requires both a showing of monopoly power and either a
misuse of that power or that the power was wrongly acquired. If a firm
has a monopoly position either by legislative grant, superior business
skill, or by being the only firm in a natural monopoly industry, § 2 can-
not reach the firm, even if the firm is reducing output and charging
prices above the competitive level as a result of its monopoly position. It
was clear that the NFL had monopoly power. But it was also clear to the
court that the NFL has a monopoly position by legislative fiat. The court
ating." Id. The court held that this language did not mandate expansion. Mid-South Grizzlies,
720 F. 2d at 776.
86. Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787.
87. Id
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was not about to use the antitrust laws to take away power granted by
Congress.s s
Suppose that instead of the Grizzlies, it was the city of Memphis
which was attempting to argue for the Grizzlies' admission to the NFL.
Suppose also that Memphis could not lure another NFL team away for
$3 million a year, the amount Memphis was willing to pay for an NFL
football team, but the Grizzlies would be willing to set up shop for $2.5
million. The city might argue under § 1 that the NFL teams compete in
the provision of sports franchises to cities, and the addition of the Griz-
zlies would create more competition, as evidenced by the Grizzlies will-
ingness to provide NFL football for a mere $2.5 million. This basic
market conception was formulated above from Raiders and Piazza, but
towards the end of existing franchise free agency, not to create a new
franchise. There is at least one problem with cities using § 1 in this con-
text. The fact that no team will move to Memphis for $3 million a year is
not the result of an agreement among the teams not to compete, rather it
is the result of an agreement not to expand by accepting anyone else into
the club.89 The addition of the Grizzlies in Memphis is not going to in-
crease competition among the teams to provide football to cities.
However, a team without a city could argue that its presence would
increase the competition among teams to provide football, since theoret-
ically that team would be competing against all others to play in the
other teams' cities. For example, a team without a city could compete
against the Saints to play in New Orleans for less in public subsidies.
This may make for a valid "essential facilities" argument, which the
Grizzlies court rejected because the doctrine "is predicated on the as-
sumption that admission of the excluded applicant would result in addi-
tional competition, in an economic rather than athletic sense." 90 To
carry this argument to its conclusion would create a world where anyone
who wants to can say they own an NFL team, demand a part of the TV
88. At a point in the opinion when the court is confusing § 1 with § 2, it says, "It would
take a court bolder than this to claim that the congressionally authorized acquisition of market
power, even market power amounting to monopoly power, was unlawful under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act." Id. at 784.
89. The court cited a 1973 study by the Stanford Research Institute which identified thir-
teen viable locations for new franchises, in addition to Memphis: Mexico City; Birmingham,
Alabama; Seattle, Washington; Nassau County, New York; Anaheim, California; Chicago, Illi-
nois; Phoenix, Arizona; Honolulu, Hawaii; Tampa, Florida; the Tidewater area of Virginia;
Charlotte-Greensboro, North Carolina; Indianapolis, Indiana; and Orlando, Florida. As al-
ready discussed, Anaheim, Phoenix, and Indianapolis acquired NFL teams by luring away
existing teams. Seattle, Tampa, and now Charlotte acquired NFL teams by expansion. Id.
90. Mid-South Grizzlies, 720 F.2d at 787.
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and gate revenues, and then compete against an established team to take
over their city. I do not think a court will be willing to take the antitrust
laws this far.91
Suppose that instead of using § 1, the city of Memphis took a § 2
approach. They might argue that the NFL is a monopoly, and even if it
acquired its monopoly legally, it is misusing its power by leaving Mem-
phis open as a "Suncoast Dome city," i.e. an attractive area which could
support a franchise, but is being used by the teams as a relocation threat.
This argument would most likely fail because in essence the claim is that
the league is limiting output in order to raise prices, exactly what we
would expect from a monopolist. Acting like a monopolist, without
more, is not illegal if the monopoly power was acquired legally. If the
real problem is that cities are being overcharged for franchises because
of the monopoly position of leagues, then antitrust law is not going to be
large enough to solve the problem, even though this is precisely the con-
cern of antitrust. There must be other rules.
IV. PROPOSED RULES OF THE GAME
There are two rule themes proposed in the world of contract. The
first theme, proposed by Shropshire, concerns the payment of damages
when a team relocates without league approval, and operates within the
relationship of team to league.92 The second theme, proposed by
Beisner, concerns mandatory lease terms, and operates within the rela-
tionship of team to city.93 Both proposals have their merits, yet neither
addresses the underlying dynamics which create the problems they are
trying to solve.
Shropshire argues that teams should be seen as having a fiduciary
relationship towards the league, i.e. each team owes a duty to the other
teams as a partner would have toward other partners in a partnership.
The significance of this fiduciary duty is to allow for compensatory and
punitive damages for breach of contract in the event a team usurps a
league developed opportunity - e.g., moves to a "Suncoast Dome site."
Essentially, Shropshire's concern is to not allow a single owner to steal
from the league. But presumably if a team is required to fully compen-
91. This also takes the city of Memphis out of the argument, so I will leave this argument
to some colorful investor types and their lawyers to use to try to break into a sports league.
92. Kenneth L. Shropshire, Opportunistic Sports Franchise Relocations: Can Punitive
Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract Strike a Balance?, 22 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 569 (1989).
93. Beisner, supra note 7, at 432.
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sate the league for the league's loss, and the team still finds a move prof-
itable, then the move should be O.K.
Shropshire claims to be concerned with an economically efficient al-
location of resources, as he cites this idea as one important goal of con-
tract remedies.94 Yet if we conceive of punitive damages as representing
a payment above what would fully compensate the league, it would seem
that franchise moves would never deter franchises from moving. If we
are concerned with an efficient allocation of resources, punitive damages
should only be employed to compensate for the probability of not get-
ting caught.95 To the extent that Shropshire views punitive damages
merely as a means to have owners internalize the full costs of a move, his
argument has merit as a way to further refine the franchise free agency
landscape. However, having the owners internalize the full costs of their
actions requires a redefinition of compensatory damages, not the addi-
tion of punitive damages.
If Shropshire is suggesting the use of punitive damages above true
compensatory damages as a means for the league to control franchise
movement for its own benefit, then his argument is simply that reloca-
tion decisions should be made by the league, not the market. This could
be good or bad for a city, depending on whether the city does or does
not already have a franchise, and depending on how benevolent the
league feels towards protecting the city's interests. As we have noted
and will continue to note, the league has little reason or incentive to
watch after the city's interests.
To protect the cities' interests, Beisner argues that Congress should
mandate certain stadium lease terms to correct for the unequal bargain-
ing power between cities and teams caused by the reduced supply of
teams.96 Beisner argues that every stadium lease should include "a noti-
fication provision, set mandatory minimums for owner contribution and
length of lease, and, upon relocation, require a franchise owner to reim-
burse the local municipality for any investment in remodeling." 97 Basi-
cally, the length of the lease and other team commitments would be
indexed to the amount of public subsidies from the municipality. This is
an interesting idea. The effect would be similar to the cities collectively
price fixing. Unfortunately, this does not have the effect of cities collec-
94. Shropshire, supra note 92, at 593.
95. Shavell, Law and Economics class at Yale Law School, Fall of 1993. The probability of
a team not getting caught relocating without permission is obviously zero.
96. Beisner, supra note 7, at 432.
97. Id.
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tively agreeing not to compete. If the problem is caused by an artificially
reduced supply of teams, then mandating team concessions in one area
will merely shift the competition for teams to another area. Cities will
still find ways to lure teams away, and the leagues will still use this real-
ity to extract public subsidies from sources other than stadium leases.
Beisner's proposal is thoughtful, but it does not solve the problem - it
just changes the landscape.
A. Congressional Proposals
The Raiders litigation caused a number of congressmen to propose
rule changes to the relocation game. The overriding concern of this
wave of proposed legislation, with limited exceptions, was how to best
keep teams from moving. It should come as no surprise that most of the
congressmen sponsoring the bills on this topic were representing com-
munities who already had professional sports teams.
Senator DeConcini and Representative Stark introduced bills which
would grant all sports leagues immunity from antitrust.98 In other
words, DeConcini's and Stark's proposed rule change was to eliminate
the rules. These bills are either motivated by the sincere, yet naive, be-
lief that a collection of team owners are the best people to watch out for
the cities' interests, or by the hope of moving from Congress into a com-
missioner's office. All of the other bills recognize that there must be
some external source for the rules of this game, whether antitrust plays a
part or not.
Bills proposed by Senators Gorton, Eagleton, Specter, and Repre-
sentative Dellums would require that certain objective criteria be met
before a team could expand.99 For example, Specter's and Dellums' bills
would make it unlawful for a team to relocate unless one of three per se
situations are met: 1) if there is a material breach of the lease by the
stadium operator, 2) if the stadium is inadequate, or 3) if a team has
experienced net losses for three consecutive years.100 Gorton and
98. S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S.682-83 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1985)
(DeConcini); H.R. 6467, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) (Stark).
99. S. 287,99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. REc. S.6631 (daily ed. Jan. 24,1985) (Gorton);
S. 259, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. § 5(a)-(b) (1985) (Eagleton); S. 172, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131
CONo. REc. S.282 (daily ed. Jan. 3, 1985) (Specter); H.R. 785, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., § 4(c)
(1985) (Dellums).
100. York, supra note 6. Specter's proposal allows for a shorter time period of team losses
if the losses "endanger the continued profitability of the team." Id. at 358-59.
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Eagleton identify a set of objective factors to betaken into account when
approving a team relocation.101
The major difference between Gorton's and Eagleton's bills lies in
who makes the determination whether a relocation is appropriate and
what standard must be met in making that determination. Eagleton's
bill would have the leagues decide relocation issues by granting the
leagues antitrust immunity if they make findings concerning the objec-
tive factors enumerated in the bill. The league will then be allowed to
prevent any relocation or allow any "reasonable and appropriate" relo-
cation after a consideration of these factors. Gorton's bill, on the other
hand, would create a Professional Sports Franchise Arbitration Board to
review any proposed relocation to determine if the relocation is "neces-
sary and appropriate."
The "necessary and appropriate" threshold in the Gorton bill, cou-
pled with external federal review, would make it almost impossible to
relocate a franchise. While a rule of this sort would create stability, this
should not be the only or even primary goal of federal legislation. Lock-
ing franchises into where they are is great for the cities with franchises,
but bad not only for the cities without franchises, but bad also for the
leagues. The teams would lose all of their bargaining strength, with only
a select few cities reaping the rewards. An evaluation of the initial draft
of Gorton's bill was that "[It] is very important legislation. But some
101. Gorton's bill identifies nine objective factors, including: "stadium adequacy; past fan
support; public financial support, including the construction of facilities; net operating losses;
and the degree to which the team has negotiated in good faith with local officials regarding the
current situation." Id. at 363.
Eagleton's bill identifies twelve factors which must be considered before a relocation is
permitted: 1) the comparative adequacy of the team's current stadium or arena; 2) the com-
parative adequacy of facilities related to the stadium or arena, including transportation, vend-
ing, or retail facilities; 3) the desire or ability of the stadium or arena operator or local
government to remedy any inadequacies in the facility, or to provide other arrangements or
incentives to make it reasonable and appropriate for the team to remain in the area; 4) the
extent to which the team has directly or indirectly received public financial support through
facilities construction or special tax treatment, and the extent to which debt on such support
remains outstanding; 5) the effects of the relocation on any contract or agreement entered into
by the team; 6) the extent to which the team's ownership or management has contributed to
any circumstance that might demonstrate that relocation is necessary; 7) the comparative op-
erating revenue in the previous three seasons; 8) any net operating losses by the team in the
previous three seasons; 9) team fan support, demonstrated by attendance, ticket sales, or other
factors; 10) the number of professional and college teams playing the same sport in the current
and proposed locations; 11) any bona fide offer to purchase the team at fair market value and
keep it in the same location; 12) the extent to which the team has engaged in good faith
negotiations aimed at keeping the team in its current stadium or arena or another facility in
the area. Id. at 366; S. 259, § 6(b), supra note 99..
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modifications have to be made so we do not continue to deprive newly
developing areas, areas where there are an abundance of fans and an
abundance of interest that would require and support a franchise."'1 2
At this point in the evaluation of the proposed rule changes one gets
the feeling that no one wants to address the real source of the problem:
less than optimal supply of franchises due to league monopoly power. 0 3
Congress needs to make rules which will increase the supply of teams.
There are two ways Congress can approach this problem. It can either
mandate expansion by the leagues, i.e. tell the leagues that they must
create X new teams by year Y; or it can reduce the barriers to entry in
the league, i.e. set a "price" which if paid would allow a team to enter
the league. Mandating expansion, while helpful, would provide only a
temporary and limited answer to the problem, and would be cumber-
some to implement. Reducing the barriers to league entry would be the
best rule change Congress could adopt. Both of these options will now
be considered in more detail.
B. The Case for Expansion
Senator Gorton realized that creating a system which would make it
more difficult for teams to relocate would not be a good rule change,
standing alone. "For the 'have-nots,' the status quo, which gives cities
without a franchise at least the chance to entice a team away from an-
other city, is preferable to a regulatory scheme designed solely to en-
courage stability."'1 For this reason, Gorton proposed in his bill' 05 to
mandate expansion in the National Football League and in Major
League Baseball. This has been a controversial idea, but not without its
supporters. 6
102. Wong, supra note 1, at 62, quoting Senator Lautenberg at the Professional Sports
Team Protection Act Hearings on S.2505 before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation (1984).
103. The congressional proposals are like adopting the two point conversion and penaliz-
ing missed field goals in order to create more touchdowns. If football really needs more
touchdowns, deepen the end zone.
104. Senator Slade Gorton, Professional Sports Franchise Relocation: Introductory Views
From the Hill, 9 SEToN HALL LEGIs. J. 1, 5 (1985).
105. S.287, supra note 99.
106. The bill introduced by Sen. Eagleton, S.259, supra note 99, was killed when then Sen.
AI Gore and Sen. Charles Mathias threatened a filibuster and demanded mandatory NFL
expansion in exchange for releasing the bill. York, supra note 6, at 371. It is certainly no
coincidence that Sen. Mathias is from Maryland, and Sen. Gorton's bill specified that one of
the expansion NFL franchises be located in Baltimore. Nor is it a coincidence that Sen. Gore
is from Tennessee, a state which could not get the Grizzlies into the league through the current
rules of antitrust.
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The first hurdle for a mandatory expansion rule is to justify congres-
sional intervention in the first place. Gorton made a compelling argu-
ment. After noting that "legislators... realize that professional sports
teams are important community assets, economically and pshychologi-
cally,"'1 7 Gorton asks:
Why should Congress intervene to help state and local offi-
cials who evidently will not help themselves by negotiating secure
leases or delaying the expenditure of public funds until a team is
committed to locate in the community?...
First, due to the enormous discrepancy between the demand
for professional sports teams and the supply, particularly in foot-
ball and baseball, it is extremely difficult for any local officials to
make meaningful demands on a team in negotiating a lease. For
every city cautious enough to require a pledge of security, there is
another city willing to forego that security to win a franchise. In
short, in a seller's market, buyers make few demands. 08
Second, the fact that the market is so heavily tilted in favor of
team owners is in large measure attributable to a series of con-
gressional manipulations of the free market .... These actions
and this omission have permitted the leagues to control the sup-
ply of the product in the marketplace virtually free from any com-
petitive pressure to respond to market demand....
It is hardly sound or balanced public policy to manipulate the
free market for the benefit of the league and owners and then to
turn our backs on the cities which become the victims of that
manipulation .... 0 9
Gorton's basic argument is that Congress helped create this monster, so
Congress should help contain it.
Even if Congress was not in any way responsible for the leagues' mo-
nopoly power, this factor would not be a reason for Congress to not
intervene and regulate the sports industry. Neale argues that "each pro-
fessional sport is a natural monopoly." 110 In other words, "there appears
to be a strong tendency toward a single league, and this for one good
reason: only a single league can produce that most useful of all products,
the World Champion.... [And] one large league can provide any quan-
tity of output as cheaply as two or more smaller firms .... [T]here is a
107. Gorton, supra note 104, at 2.
108. Gorton noted that "in the past 20 years, state and local governments have spent over
$6 billion building or renovating stadiums." Id.
109. Id. at 2-3.
110. Neale, supra note 48, at 4.
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likelihood that the first league in the sport - like the first utility in a city
- will become a monopoly."1'
Johnson cites Lowell and Weistart to rebut the argument that sports
franchises are analogous to public utilities. Lowell and Weistart argue
that sports franchises are not like public utilities because they lack "the
presence of an activity affecting the basic public need for food, shelter,
and sanitation. 1" 2 It is difficult to argue with the observed difference
between sports and public utilities, but this observation is missing the
point. Although sports plays a strong role in the American way of life
and could be viewed as a public trust, it is not these characteristics which
make sports like public utilities. Instead, sports are like public utilities in
that they are both natural monopolies, and if left unregulated would be
fertile ground for individuals to extract excess profits at the expense of
the public welfare.
If leagues hold their powerful positions because the sports industry is
a natural monopoly, then they will be able to act like monopolists with-
out existing antitrust law able to do anything about these actions. The
only way to have the leagues offer their products at a price which ap-
proximates a competitive level is through external regulation." 3
Of course, the leagues do not like mandatory expansion because it
would weaken the owners' privileged position. Perhaps the value of the
current owners' investment will be diminished, but so what? "By some
estimates, 95% of the value of a franchise is economic rent that is the
result of team monopoly and monopsony advantage imparted by legisla-
tion.""' 4 Regardless of how the owners acquired a monopoly position" 5 ,
the owners should not feel entitled to reap the benefits of a monopoly
position indefinitely. Investors must always bear the risk that the gov-
ernment will come to its senses and do what is in the public interest.
111. Id. at 6, 8.
112. Johnson, supra note 1, at 234.
113. "Expansion to thirty-five or forty [baseball] teams by the end of the century would
mean that more cities have their demand for a team satisfied, a more equitable relationship
would develop between existing teams and host cities, and there would be a greater number of
MLB players. This outcome sounds like something economists call a welfare maximizing solu-
tion. But economists never claimed that welfare maximization was a property of unregulated
monopolies." ZIMBALIST, supra note 27, at 146.
114. Baade & Dye, supra note 34, at 265 (referring to an estimate made by Gerald Scully,
sports economist).
115. It at least appears clear that each of the four major leagues - baseball, football,
basketball, and hockey - do have monopoly positions, without the prospect of any serious
competition.
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Other criticisms have been leveled against mandatory expansion.
For example, the Justice Department, at the time Gorton's bill was on
the table, believed that there was no justification for mandatory
expansion.116
In a free market system, firms -not regulators or legislators-
are generally considered the best judges of how and where their
products are marketed. Congress does not mandate that steel
manufacturers, for example, must open new plants in specific cit-
ies according to a specific schedule. The assessment of demand
and the amount of athletic and managerial talent available to sat-
isfy this demand are best left to the judgement of the NFL and
Major League Baseball.'17
The comparison of sports leagues to steel manufacturers reveals the
flaw in the Justice Department's argument. First, if the steel industry is
competitive, there would be no reason for Congress to mandate that
steel manufacturers open new plants. But even if the industry is monop-
olized and the antitrust laws continue to be ineffective in reaching the
steel industry, as they were in 1920,118 a city could unilaterally subsidize
or start up a steel plant located within its boundaries to meet the city's
steel needs, and that plant could independently produce steel. A city
cannot unilaterally create a major league baseball team which could in-
dependently produce baseball for the city. This dilemma is another twist
caused by the unique nature of sports leagues. The arguments as to why
sports leagues are unique, do not fit neatly into antitrust analysis, and
should not be governed by antitrust law. These arguments are then why
the federal government needs to set rules specifically governing sports
leagues. If left alone, the leagues will certainly be able to assess the de-
mand for sports franchises, as claimed by the Justice Department, but
this does not mean that the leagues will meet the demand - quite the
contrary.
Mandatory expansion, however, is a cumbersome way for the federal
government to regulate the sports industry. The government would have
to decide how many teams a league could support, then a decision will
need to be made concerning which cities should get a team. Senator
DeConcini, who proposed that leagues should be immune from anti-
116. Gray, supra note 24, at 158.
117. IM, quoting the Justice Department's position during the Hearings on Professional
Sports Antitrust Legislation, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985).
118. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). US Steel
brought 180 independent firms under one umbrella, controlling 80-95% of domestic produc-
tion of steel. The court refused to break up US Steel because "the law does not make mere
size an offence or the existence of unexerted power an offence." Id at 451.
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trust,119 argued that "Congress should not be in the business of selecting
cities... [but] should create a legal climate in which leagues can follow
their best business judgment.' 120 DeConcini has a good point about
Congress creating a legal climate if included in this climate is an oppor-
tunity for cities to follow their best judgement. In other words, Congress
should create a level playing field for all participants. This is why the
best rule Congress could give the professional sports industry is to re-
duce the barriers to entry, and let the chips fall where they may.
C. Reduced Barriers to Entry
If there were a "price" set for participation in the major league sports
industry, then cities would be free to make an allocative decision about
whether a sports franchise is worth that price to the city. We could trust
this decision the way we trust any consumer decision to lead to the most
efficient allocation of resources. Cities without franchises could get one
if they wanted one, and cities with franchises could not be extorted by
threats of relocation, since a city could replace a lost franchise. It ap-
pears to be the only solution which does not distinctly advantage the
'haves' over the 'have-nots', or vice versa.12' Even though this may be a
good solution to a tough problem, few have been willing to support re-
ducing the barriers to league entry, nor has it been given much serious
study.' 22 Two questions must be answered concerning reduced barriers
to entry before it can be embraced: first, what is the buy-in "price," and
second, what affect will this have on the sports themselves.
The question about the price to be paid for league entry is meant to
address the concern many have about the economic viability of expan-
sion. Johnson suggests that the "price" to join a major league should
include 1) minimum population requirements, 2) adequate playing facili-
ties, and 3) a minimal level of financial solvency.'" He also suggests that
cities in which a franchise fails financially could be required to wait five
years or longer before reentry into the league. Once entry requirements
are met, Johnson advises that a two-year waiting period take effect for
119. S.298, supra note 98.
120. York, supra note 6, at 370.
121. All of the cities would be better off under this proposal except those cities who cur-
rently have franchises only for the prestige value. Those cities will lose because the value of
the franchise to them will be diluted, similar to a person who buys a car $30,000 over cost only
to display his wealth to the neighbors, and then the same car starts selling at cost and half the
block buys one. Similarly, the owners who bought into the sports industry to take advantage
of its monopoly position vail lose, but neither of these losses should cause much concern.
122. Johnson, supra note 1, at 239.
123. Id.
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the new team to organize its front office, to promote the team, to pre-
pare the playing facilities, and to allow the league time to adjust its
schedule.
The requirements for entry should approximate the population and
stadium capacity of the community with the smallest media market cur-
rently in the league. Consider that in 1993, the Cincinnati Reds were
operating profitably in the 30th largest media market, and without incor-
porating any smaller markets it would be possible for Major League
Baseball to expand to thirty-six teams, and additionally, another six are
within 14% of Cincinnati.' 24 We could take Cincinnati's average annual
gate receipts over the last five years and use this figure as a "price" -
guaranteed ticket sales of X amount at at least Y price level. If any team
fails to meet this requirement in two consecutive years, then the team
may be voted out of the league. In this manner, a city in a higher media
market than thirtieth could acquire a team, with a good chance that the
population alone would keep the team in the league. At the same time,
a smaller city could still acquire a franchise if it was willing to subsidize
the team in the amount necessary to cover the guaranteed ticket sales
requirement. If a team were in danger of not meeting the quota, tickets
could be bought up by the local chamber of commerce or by the local
government if either thought the team was worth the cost. The commu-
nities could make rational decisions concerning the worth of sports
teams and at the same time the leagues could be left alone to make any
marketing, relocative, or internal allocative decisions as they see fit,
while at the same time protecting themselves from free riders. Reducing
the barriers to entry sounds attractive.
Those not yet convinced, or those who have something to lose, will
still argue that expansion will hurt the quality of the game product in two
ways which will affect the demand for professional sports: 1) it will re-
duce the quality of player talent, and 2) it will saturate the market. In
considering both arguments, the reader should first reflect on the success
of the NCAA in basketball and football. Every year millions of fans
await anxiously as the NCAA basketball tournament selection commit-
tee whittles the college basketball field down to sixty-four teams, none of
which could beat the Dallas Mavericks. Neither the number of teams in
a league nor the absolute skill level of the players can be shown to be
related to fan interest.
Neale asserts that as a league expands, the quality of the product is
affected by two contrary tendencies: "diminishing quality returns" and
124. ZrMBALISr, supra note 27, at 145.
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the "input-enthusiasm effect."'1 5 As less skilled players are drawn into
the sport, the demand function may contract, leading to a reduction in
revenue per game seat. "However, we know by introspection that the
reduction will be small since the appeal of a seat depends mostly on the
uncertainty of the outcome and on the weather."' 6 But any reduction in
demand due to diminishing quality returns will be counteracted by the
input-enthusiasm effect. As leagues expand into new areas, public atten-
tion will be drawn more to the particular sport and more private concen-
tration will be put into a development of the skills of the sport. "In other
words, the larger the scale of operations, the higher the quality of inputs
and of products.... Larger scale, therefore, does not necessarily increase
costs more than revenue."'127
Bill James, baseball expert and rotisserie guru, estimates that there is
sufficient talent for sixty major league baseball teams." Both Larry
MacPhail in 1951 and George Will in 1990 suggest that baseball would be
better organized if there were expansion to six major leagues instead of
two. 12 9 The bottom line is that expansion should be embraced, not
feared. Reduced barriers to entry will not lead to the downfall of profes-
sional sports, but it will change the rules of the game.
V. CONCLUSION
Our cities see in professional sports an opportunity to improve the
quality of life of its citizens. A sports team can be used to unite and even
educate a community, or it can give a city prestige. For whatever rea-
sons, more cities want and can support major league sports teams than
teams are made available. Team owners, acting as individual leagues,
restrict the amount of teams available to be "rented" by the cities. This
allows individual team owners to extract excess profits from the cities,
which results in a sub-optimal allocation of resources. The only way to
correct this situation is for Congress to reduce the barriers to entry into
professional sports leagues. The fact that a community like Tampa/St.
Pete could build a baseball stadium in the 24th largest U.S. market and
have twenty-eight self-interested owners decide whether they can par-
ticipate in the national pastime is an embarrassment. Perhaps, when the
Piazza litigation fails to get the Giants transferred to Tampa/St. Pete, a
125. Neale, supra note 48, at 8.
126. Id. at 8 n.7.
127. Id. at 9.
128. ZMBALIST, supra note 27, at 143.
129. Id. I imagine they both envision the "leagues" as one league, existing under the
umbrella of Major League Baseball. See Neale, supra note 48, at 6.
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few congressmen will take notice of the real problem between cities and
professional sports: the sports output is controlled by a select few indi-
viduals with little incentive to allow a city like St. Pete to play with them.
Professional sports is truly the tail that wags the dog.

